Canada's C-22 bill would let the government require technology companies, including firms outside Canada, to build "technical capabilities" so police can get at data. Signal has said it would leave the Canadian market. Psiphon, the anti-censorship VPN that keeps millions of Iranians online during shutdowns, has said it will leave the country if the bill passes.

Wired's account of the bill is the source for who has spoken. Apple and Meta have criticized C-22. DuckDuckGo and NordVPN say they would consider pulling their services. The bill was first proposed in 2025 and was partly rewritten after criticism from companies and civil-society groups. It says companies will not have to introduce a "systemic vulnerability." Opponents say that sentence does not stop an order to weaken encryption in a specific case. In May, members of the U.S. House Judiciary and Foreign Affairs committees wrote Canadian officials that companies could be asked to introduce vulnerabilities, build backdoors, or bypass encryption. Wired's frame for the bill is wider than Canada. The column says democratic governments already have broad surveillance powers for crimes that involve encrypted data, and that the new drafts still ask for a capability the service was built not to have. Kate Robertson of Citizen Lab told Wired that some officials treat the technology itself as the crime scene, and forget that hospitals, banks, national-security agencies, and police services have to run on the same platform.

Signal's objection, in Wired's telling, is not limited to a Canadian office. The bill would require changes to Signal's open-source projects that the organization has called unacceptable, which is why the stated response is to leave the market. Psiphon's stake is the people who use it when a government turns the local internet off. A rule that makes the VPN keep metadata changes the tool those people are holding. DuckDuckGo sits with Psiphon on that point: the product is built to have nothing for a retention order to seize. NordVPN told Wired it would consider the same exit rather than add the logs.

The second fight is over metadata the privacy tools refuse to store

C-22 can also require companies to retain metadata about user activity. Psiphon and DuckDuckGo say their VPNs are built to avoid that collection. A retention order would mean changing the product so it keeps records they do not want. Afsaneh Rigot, founder of the De|Center, told Wired that requiring metadata by default creates a surveillance capability inside a tool that did not have one, and that the effect will not stay inside Canada because the same tools are used in places such as Iran. A federal judge called a Flock search mass surveillance. That case was a camera network. C-22 is the proposal to make the encrypted services on the phone keep a record too. Nobody can guard a million kilometres of seabed cable. The cable is the physical path. The bill is about what the companies at the ends of it must be able to hand over. Wired's list of governments that have already moved past a proposal is short: the UK and Australia can compel a company to break encryption. The longer list, still at the proposal stage in the column, is the EU, France, India, Ireland, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. C-22 is Canada's entry on that second list, revised once after the first round of criticism and still opposed by the companies that would have to build the access.

Britain and Australia already have compulsion laws. Canada is the latest draft

Those two statutes are the ones Wired treats as already in force. C-22 still says a company need not introduce a systemic vulnerability. The companies' exit threats, and the May letter from the U.S. House committees, are the argument that a requirement to build access is the vulnerability under another name.

A mailing address does not answer where the users are

Joseph Lorenzo-Hall, security portfolio lead at the Internet Society, told Wired that changing headquarters is a weak plan when the statute follows the users, which is how he reads C-22. A company that stores nothing cannot meet an order to start storing it by pointing at an empty database. He said a safe haven needs laws that let the firm keep a privacy promise, not only a favorable wind for strong encryption. Developers are looking for those jurisdictions anyway. The column's last point is that the search does not solve delivery: the tools still have to work for people living under the statutes. That is the choice Wired leaves with the companies.