Tigerfish, a San Francisco transcription company that works for police departments, prosecutors and several large technology firms, has closed a cloud storage bucket that left customer work open to the public. The exposed material included transcripts of police interviews and body-camera footage, along with the raw audio and video those transcripts were made from, according to TechCrunch, which verified the files before contacting the company.

The bucket sat on Amazon's S3 service and was reachable at an easy-to-guess web address with no password, said Anurag Sen, the security researcher who found it. Sen discovered the files in October and emailed the company. He told TechCrunch that he never heard back, and eventually brought the details to the publication so the exposure would get closed.

What was sitting in the open

Sen's find was not a single misconfigured folder but a directory listing that exposed whole sets of customer material, including invoices naming the departments and offices that buy the service. For a transcription vendor, that pairing is the damaging part: a recording identifies the people in it, and an invoice identifies who asked for the work and when.

Tigerfish president Adam Goldberg said the company acted once TechCrunch reached out. "We've blocked all public access to the bucket you identified, including directory listings and individual files," he said in an email. He added that the company had checked its other buckets and found them closed as well. Asked whether customers had been told, Tigerfish did not answer a follow-up message. The company said Sen's original warning had been caught by a spam filter.

The failure was a checkbox, not a hack

Nothing in the account suggests an intruder. Sen's work over the past decade has consisted of finding datasets that were simply left open, including military email spilling from a defense cloud server, a national license plate surveillance system and databases of customer records. He described the pattern to TechCrunch as ordinary human error, naming the case of an engineer who starts a test database on a Friday, turns off authentication to check an API, and forgets to close it before the weekend.

That kind of mistake is becoming easier to make and easier to find. Amazon now puts multistep warnings in front of anyone trying to make a bucket public, and newer development platforms such as Lovable and Supabase have added similar guardrails after users shipped private data by accident. Meanwhile automated scanners and search engines built for exposed storage mean a bucket that is open for a weekend can be catalogued well before Monday.

The same weak-link problem shows up in enterprise software, where a single help-desk call can undo years of investment, and in the long run of bugs that let attackers skip authentication entirely. Cloud storage misconfigurations are less dramatic than a vulnerability with a name, and they need no exploit at all.

Why police recordings raise the stakes

Transcription has become a routine part of evidence handling. Departments record interviews, body-camera footage and dispatch audio, then send the files out to be turned into searchable text. The vendor gets the original recording, which is often the most sensitive artifact a police agency holds, and the resulting transcript usually keeps speaker labels and timestamps.

Sen argued that the public conversation about security is pointed the wrong way. "Everyone often fears shadowy hackers," he said. In his experience the bigger problem is sensitive systems and databases "wide open to the public internet without a password." His findings suggest the second category is not rare, and that vendors serving government clients are not screened any more closely than anyone else.

What remains unknown is the part customers will care about most. Neither Tigerfish nor TechCrunch has established how long the bucket had been public, whether anyone else downloaded from it, or which agencies appear in the invoices. Until those questions are answered, the departments that outsourced their recordings have no way to judge whether the exposure touched a case they are still prosecuting.